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21 Unreported D.C. dec. (D. N.D. 4/6/93).
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The debtors sought to avoid a
nonpurchase-money security interest in a handgun claimed
as an exempt household good. The court held that the pistol
was a household good and the lien was avoidable as
impairing the exemption. The court adopted the definition of
“household good” established in In re McGreeny, 955 F.2d
957 (4th Cir. 1992) as goods typically found around the
home and used to facilitate the day-to-day living within the
home. Thus, because a pistol is used in the home for
protection, a pistol was a household good. Matter of
Raines, 161 B.R. 548 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993).
HOMESTEAD. The debtor sought to avoid a
nonpurchase-money security interest in the debtor’s mobile
home as impairing the debtor’s homestead exemption. The
creditor argued that the mobile home was personal property
not eligible for the homestead exemption. The court held
that the Virginia homestead exemption was broad enough to
include mobile homes; therefore, the exemption would be
allowed and the nonpurchase-money security interest
avoided for impairing the exemption. In re Goad, 161 B.R.
161 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1993).
TAX REFUND. The debtors claimed a federal income
tax refund as exempt under the exemption for wages under
Fla. Stat. § 222.11. The court held that the refund was not
eligible for the exemption because the funds were not held
in a bank account to which the debtors had access and the
taxes were not considered wages earned by the debtors. In
re Lancaster, 161 B.R. 308 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AVOIDABLE LIENS. The IRS had filed a claim for
$207,000 in taxes, penalties and interest owed by the
debtors. The debtors had no assets other than $15,000 in
exempt property and sought to avoid the IRS pre-petition
tax lien to the extent the lien was unsecured. The debtors
argued that Dewsnup v. Timm, 113 S.Ct. 773 (1992) barred
such avoidance only as to consensual liens; therefore, the
nonconsensual tax lien was avoidable to the extent it was
unsecured. The court held that Section 522(c)(2)(ii)(B)
specifically excludes tax liens from avoidance as to exempt
property and that Dewsnup applied to nonconsensual liens,
also. In re Doviak, 161 B.R. 379 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993).
DISCHARGE. The debtor filed suit against the IRS for
post-discharge levies against the debtor. The IRS argued
that the claims for taxes supporting the levies were
nondischargeable because the debtor failed to file a return
for the tax years involved. As proof of the debtor’s failure to
file, the IRS presented two substitute returns. The court held
that a valid substitute return was prima facie evidence of the
debtor’s failure to file the return, placing the burden on the
debtor to show that a return was filed or that the substitute
return was inaccurate. The court also held that only
substitute returns which are subscribed by the Secretary of
the Treasury are valid for this purpose; therefore, because
one of the substitute returns was not subscribed by the
Secretary, an issue of fact remained as to whether the debtor
had filed a return for that tax year. In re Bank, 161 B.R.
406 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1993).
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. The debtor had received a
discharge in a Chapter 13 case after paying all claims for
federal income taxes, and the case was closed. However, the
IRS filed liens, made levies and coerced the debtor into
making post-discharge payments on the discharged taxes.
The debtor brought suit to reopen the case and to recover the
excess assessments and resulting costs for the suit. The IRS
claimed the defense of no waiver of sovereign immunity
because the debtor’s suit was not a claim of the bankruptcy
estate. The court held that Section 106(a) provided a waiver
of sovereign immunity only as to claims which were
property of the estate at the commencement of the case or
arising before the case is closed, Sections 541, 1306;
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therefore, because the debtor’s case was closed and only the
debtor would benefit from the suit, the IRS could not be
considered to have waived its immunity under Section
106(a). Query: Once the case was reopened, would not the
claim become estate property and have arisen prior to the
new closing of the case? Also, just because the debtor would
be the sole beneficiary of the suit, does that remove the
claim from belonging to the estate? If so, the definition of
estate property would exclude all of the debtor’s property in
excess of the claims against the estate, which it does not.
The holding subverts the need for the Bankruptcy Courts to
enforce the discharge rules and enforce the IRS waiver of
immunity where the IRS has filed a claim and has refused to
abide by the orders of the court as to that claim. In re
Hardy, 161 B.R. 320 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1993).
TAX LIEN. The IRS had filed a pre-petition tax lien
against the debtor, and the lien attached to real property
owned by the debtor. The real property was insured by the
debtor. After the debtor filed for Chapter 7, the property was
vandalized and the trustee eventually recovered $750,000
from the insurance company. The IRS claimed that its tax
lien extended to the insurance proceeds as a payment for the
original property covered by the lien. The court held that
under Pennsylvania law, a contract for insurance was a
personal contract of indemnity protecting the insured’s
interest and not an indemnity on the property; therefore, the
debtor’s interest in the proceeds did not arise and could not
be subject to the tax lien until the vandalism occurred. The
court held that because the vandalism occurred post-
petition, the tax lien did not attach to the proceeds. In re CS
Associates, 161 B.R. 144 (Bankr. E.D.  Pa. 1993).
The IRS had filed a pre-petition tax lien against the
debtor and had levied against the debtor’s monthly annuity
payments. The annuity provided the debtor with a monthly
payment until the debtor’s death. The debtor’s tax liabilities
were discharged in bankruptcy and the annuity was not
estate property. The debtor argued that the tax lien could not
attach to the post-petition payments because the payments
were contingent upon the debtor’s survival. The court held
that the tax lien attached pre-petition to the debtor’s right to
receive the payments and continued as to the post-petition
payments because the only contingency applied to the
termination of the payments by the debtor’s death, a
condition subsequent. In re Wessel, 161 B.R. 155 (Bankr.
D. S.C. 1993).
CONTRACTS
INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACT. The
plaintiffs had prepaid for shipments of beans under a
contract with a bean processor. The defendant held a
security interest in the processor’s equipment, inventory and
accounts receivable. When it becamse clear that the
processor did not have sufficient beans to meet all contracts,
the defendant encouraged the processor to fill new contracts
first, resulting in no beans being shipped to the plaintiffs and
the defendant receiving sufficient payments for its loans to
the processor. The plaintiffs sued the defendant for recovery
of the prepayments under U.C.C. § 2-722 and for damages
for tortious interference with contractual relations. The court
held that recovery under U.C.C. § 2-722 was barred because
the processor had not specifically identified the beans which
were to have been shipped to the plaintiffs under the prepaid
contracts. The court held that summary judgment for the
defendant on the tortious interference claim was improper
because the trial court had not made any findings of fact
concerning the defendant’s role in the processor’s decision
not to ship beans first to the prepaid buyers or concerning
whether the defendant was justified in influencing the
processor because the defendant was protecting a superior
interest in the beans. In re Quality Processing, Inc., 9 F.3d
1360 (8th Cir. 1993).
CORPORATIONS
MORTGAGING OF CORPORATION PROPERTY.
A father, brother and sister were the shareholders of a farm
corporation, with the father, brother and the sister’s husband
as directors. The brother was also the owner of a feed lot
corporation. The two corporations provided financial
backing for each other and when the feed lot corporation
needed additional loans, the father and brother refinanced
loans of both corporations and granted a mortgage on the
farm corporation land. The sister had objected to the
mortgage but the husband later ratified the action of the
other two directors. The mortgaged land was later deeded to
the sister and husband who attempted to defend against the
foreclosure of the property by arguing that the mortgage was
void as not properly authorized by the directors of the farm
corporation. The defendants argued that the brother had a
conflicting financial interest in the loan because the feed lot
corporation benefited from the mortgage. The court held
that under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 21-2077, shareholder approval
of the grant of the mortgage was not required. The court
also held that because the brother had a conflicting financial
interest in the mortgage, approval of all directors was
required, which occurred when the third director later
ratified the grant of the mortgage. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Kissinger Farms, 508 N.W.2d 568 (Neb. 1993).
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
CLEAN WATER ACT-ALM § 2.03.* The plaintiffs
were neighbors of a farm operated by the defendant farm
partnership. The plaintiffs alleged several violations of the
Clean Water Act by the defendants from runoff of manure
applied to fields and chemicals used to wash the defendant’s
milking facility and added to the manure spread on the field.
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had no standing to
bring the suit because the plaintiffs alleged no “injury in
fact.” The court held that the plaintiffs’ allegations of
aesthetic harm from the odors and from the pollution of the
streams running through the plaintiffs’ properties were
sufficient to support standing to bring the suit. The
defendant also argued that the plaintiffs failed to allege any
violation of a permit; however, the court held that such a
claim was not required because the defendant did not have a
permit to discharge manure or chemicals. The defendant
argued that the plaintiffs failed to claim any ongoing
violations of the Act because the only post-petition
discharges have been minor or isolated incidents. The court
held that the defendant failed to show that it was “absolutely
clear” that the discharges would not reoccur. The defendant
further argued that manure was not a “pollutant” under the
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Act because the manure was not discarded but was used as
fertilizer. The court held that one definition of “pollutant”
under the Act was “agricultural waste,” which included
manure used as fertilizer. Finally, the court held that an
issue of fact remained as to whether the manure pollution
from the defendant’s grain farm, cattle raising, and dairy
farm was point-sourced, but that all three operations could
qualify as point-sources. Concerned Area Residents v.
Southview Farm, 834 F. Supp. 1410 (W.D. N.Y. 1993).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
BORROWER’S RIGHTS-ALM § 11.01[2].* The
debtors were each 50 percent shareholders of a farm S
corporation. The corporation had suffered net losses for
several years and defaulted on FmHA farm loans. The
debtors applied for loan servicing, leaseback/buyback, and
homestead protection. The debtors were denied loan
servicing and leaseback/buyback because of the debtors’
improper disposal of collateral. The court held that the bad
faith of the debtors evidenced by the improper disposal of
collateral was sufficient to deny the debtors the benefits of
the loan servicing and leaseback/buyback program. The
FmHA also denied the debtors use of the homestead
protection program because the debtors did not have any
income from farming for at least two of the previous six
years. The FmHA argued that the S corporation had no
profits during those years; therefore, the debtors had no
faming income. The court held that the debtors’ income
from farming was to be based on the S corporation’s gross
income. Schmidt v. Espy, 9 F.3d 1352 (8th Cir. 1993).
CONSERVATION. The ASCS has issued interim
regulations which expand the number of states from 9 to 20
which may participate in the Wetlands Reserve Program and
to revise the enrollment process. 59 Fed. Reg. 3772 (Jan.
27, 1994).
The Departments of the Army, Agriculture, and Interior
and the Environmental Protection Agency have signed a
Memorandum of Agreement that recognizes the SCS as the
lead federal agency for wetlands determinations on
agricultural lands. The agreement also articulates the policy
and procedures for wetlands determinations. 59 Fed. Reg.
2920 (Jan. 19, 1994).
FARM CREDIT SYSTEM-ALM § 11.01[2].* The FCS
has adopted as final regulations allowing FCS institutions to
document the existence of a first lien on the security for
long-term real estate mortgage loans by obtaining title
insurance or an attorney’s certification. 59 Fed. Reg. 3785
(Jan. 27, 1994).
PERSIHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT-ALM § 10.05[2].* The plaintiff had been a 22 percent
shareholder, vice-president and director of a dealer in
perishable commodities licensed under PACA. After a
majority of the corporation stock was purchased by third
parties, in August 1988, the plaintiff resigned as a director,
and vice-president but retained the stock in the corporation.
After the first corporation filed for bankruptcy, the AMS
filed a complaint against the corporation for failure to make
full prompt payment for produce purchased from July 1989
to February 1990. The AMS notified the plaintiff that
because the plaintiff owned more than 10 percent of the
stock, the plaintiff was “reasonably connected” with the
corporation and subject to the employment restrictions of 7
U.S.C. § 499h(b). The plaintiff argued that the 10 percent
rule of 7 U.S.C. § 499a)(b)(9) should be construed to create
a rebuttable presumption which would not apply to the
plaintiff because the plaintiff had a minority interest and no
authority over the corporation during the time the payments
were not made. The court held that the statute was
unambiguous and absolute that a 10 percent shareholder was
“reasonably connected” with the corporation under PACA.
The court noted that PACA has been in existence since 1930
and the “toughness” of the law was well known to the
plaintiff with 30 years experience in the produce business.
Hawkins v. Agric. Marketing Service, 10 F.3d 1125 (5th
Cir. 1993).
PESTICIDES-ALM § 2.04.* The plaintiffs alleged
personal injuries resulted from an insecticide manufactured
by the defendant which was applied to the plaintiffs’ home
by a pest control company. The plaintiffs alleged that the
insecticide was defective and unreasonably dangerous, the
defendant failed to use ordinary care in the formulation and
manufacture of the pesticide, and the defendant failed to
provide warnings about the dangers of the pesticide. The
court held that the action for failure to warn was pre-empted
by FIFRA but that the other actions were not. DeGazarian
v. Dow Chemical Co., 836 F. Supp. 1429 (W.D. Ark.
1993).
POULTRY INSPECTION. In amending its earlier
opinion, see A.L.D.  Vol 4, p. 120, the court added
discussion of the definition of “the same as” in the Poultry
Products Inspection Act which required that imported
poultry products be subject to “the same” inspection
requirements as U.S. poultry products. Mississippi Poultry
Ass’n v. Madigan, 9 F.3d 1113 (5th Cir. 1993), amending,
992 F.2d 1359 (5th Cir. 1993).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
DISCLAIMERS. The decedent died on February 13,
1988 with the estate passing by law to the decedent’s three
children, one of whom was under age 21. On May 12, 1989,
the children filed written disclaimers of their interests in the
estate except for $600,000, resulting in the remainder of the
estate passing to the surviving spouse. The estate obtained
an extension to file the estate tax return which was filed on
May 13, 1989 and included the disclaimed amount as a
marital deduction. The estate argued that the nine month
time limit of I.R.C. § 2518 did not apply to disclaimers
which created a marital deduction. The court held that the
statute was clear and defined qualified disclaimers for estate
tax purposes as being filed within nine months of the
decedent’s death or when an heir reaches age 21; therefore,
only the disclaimer of the child under age 21 was qualified.
Fitzgerald v. U.S., 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,152
(W.D. La. 1993).
GROSS ESTATE-ALM § 5.02.* As part of a divorce
property settlement, the decedent’s former spouse executed
a deed to the spouse’s share of the residence and farm to the
decedent in exchange for a promise to provide support for
    Agricultural Law Digest                                                                                                                                                                                               29
the couple’s children and to pay one-half of any proceeds of
the sale of the property to the children. The decedent’s
estate did not include one-half of the value of the residence
and farm in the decedent’s estate, arguing that the property
was held in trust for the children. The court held that the
entire value of the property was included in the decedent’s
gross estate because (1) the deed transferred the spouse’s
entire interest in the property to the decedent, (2) no trust or
fiduciary tax returns were filed, and (3) no trust income was
distributed to the children. Est. of Climer v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1994-29.
    VALUATION-ALM § 6.01[6].* The taxpayer
established an irrevocable four-year trust funded with the
taxpayer’s real and personal property. The trust provided for
an annual annuity, payable in monthly installments, equal to
the greater of a fixed amount or 5 percent of the fair market
value of the trust assets on the creation date of the trust. If
the taxpayer died before the termination of the trust, the
trust property passed to the taxpayer’s estate; otherwise,
upon termination of the trust, the property passed to the
taxpayer’s children. The taxpayer also established a three-
year trust which was funded with the taxpayer’s personal
residence.The residence trust provided for the taxpayer’s
rent-free use of the property as a residence, with the trust
property passing to the taxpayer’s estate if the taxpayer died
before the termination of the trust. The taxpayer’s children
were also the remainder holders of the residence trust. The
IRS ruled that the taxpayer’s interest in the five-year trust
was a qualified annuity interest under I.R.C. § 2702(b). The
IRS also ruled that the residence trust was a qualified
residence trust under Treas. Reg. § 25.2702-5.  Ltr. Rul.
9402011, Oct. 8, 1993.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
DEPRECIATION-ALM § 4.03[4].* The taxpayer was a
corporation which was formed by the shareholders of
another corporation which liquidated its assets and sold its
last textile mill to the taxpayer. The taxpayer corporation
also had several new shareholders. The purchase agreement
set the price for the fixed assets; however, in determining
the basis of the assets for the depreciation deduction, the
taxpayer allocated the total purchase price between the fixed
assets and the inventory based on the relative fair market
value of the assets.  The IRS denied the depreciation to the
extent the basis claimed by the taxpayer exceeded the value
set by the purchase agreement. The IRS argued that, under
Commissioner v. Danielson, 378 F.2d 771 (3d Cir. 1967),
the taxpayer was bound by the purchase agreement unless
the taxpayer proved that the agreement resulted from
mistake, fraud, undue influence or duress. The court held
that because no mistake, fraud, undue influence or duress
was found, the taxpayer had to use a basis for the fixed
assets based upon the purchase agreement price for the
assets. North American Rayon Corp. v. Comm’r, 94-1
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,014 (6th Cir. 1993), aff’g, T.C.
Memo. 1992-610.
INSTALLMENT REPORTING-ALM § 6.03[1].* The
IRS has adopted as final regulations governing the test rate
of interest on qualified debt instruments and cash method
debt instruments for the purpose of determining whether the
interest is adequate under I.R.C. § 483.
The adequacy of interest in a deferred payment sale is
tested against a test rate dependent upon the amount of
seller financing involved.  Where the amount of seller
financing in a transaction is $3,332,400 or less (for 1993),
under the general rule, the test rate is the lesser of nine
percent or 100 percent of the Applicable Federal Rate
(AFR).  I.R.C. § 1274A.  See Rev. Rul. 92-6, 1992-1 C.B.
611. Where the amount of seller financing is more than
$3,332,400 (for 1993), the test rate is 100 percent of the
AFR.  I.R.C. § 1274(d)(1); See Rev. Rul. 92-6, 1992-1 C.B.
611.
Under the regulations, a debt instrument used in a sale-
leaseback transaction cannot be either a qualified debt
instrument or a cash method debt instrument. Treas. Reg. §
1.1274A-1(b)(1). Any seller financing provided in
connection with a sale-leaseback transaction must use a test
rate of 110 percent of the AFR.  I.R.C. § 1274(e).
A debt instrument having contingent payments cannot be
a qualified debt instrument unless it can be determined at
the time of sale that the maximum stated principal amount
due cannot exceed $3,332,400 (for 1993). Treas. Reg. §
1.1274A-1(b)(2).
A debt instrument having contingent payments cannot be
a cash method debt instrument unless it can be determined
at the time of sale that the maximum stated principal amount
due cannot exceed $2,380,300 (for 1993). Treas. Reg. §
1.1274A-1(b)(2).
In general, both parties are required to account for the
interest in seller-financed transactions under the accrual
method of accounting.  However, if the amount of seller-
financing is $2,380,300 or less (for 1993), both parties may
elect to account for interest under the cash method of
accounting.  I.R.C. § 1274A(c); See Rev. Rul. 92-6, 1992-1
C.B. 611.  The election is made by both parties signing an
statement making the election and declaring that the debt
instrument involved qualifies as a cash method debt
instrument. The statement is to be signed before the tax
return is due and filed with both parties’ tax returns for the
taxable year the debt instrument was issued. Treas. Reg. §
1.1274A-1(c).
The election to report interest on the cash method of
accounting is not available to dealers or those on the accrual
method of accounting.  I.R.C. § 1274A(c)(2)(B).
If the election to use the cash method is made, and the
seller transfers the buyer's obligation to a third party, the
transferee reports interest in accordance with cash
accounting; however, a successor lender on an accrual
method of accounting must use the accrual method,
although the cash method borrower may remain on the cash
method.  I.R.C. § 1274A(c)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.1274A-
1(c)(2).
All debt instruments arising from the same transaction
are treated as one instrument and all sales or exchanges
which are part of the same transaction are treated as one
transaction. I.R.C. § 1274A(d)(1). The regulations provide
examples for application of the aggregation rule. Thus, a
series of sales of undivided interests in the same property to
the same person over time and pursuant to a plan are to be
aggregated into one transaction and one debt instrument.
Similarly, where two unrelated persons purchase undivided
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interests in the same property and contribute the interests to
a partnership, the two transactions are treated as one
transaction and one debt instrument. The examples also treat
the purchase of all of the shareholders’ interests in a
corporation as one transaction where the offer to each
shareholder is identical. Treas. Reg. § 1.1274A-1(b)(3).
Debt instruments issued in a debt-for-debt exchange that
qualified as a Section 1001 exchange are eligible for the
election to be a cash method debt instrument if the other
requirements are met, unless the principal purpose of the
modification is to defer interest income or deductions.
Treas. Reg. § 1.1274A-1(c)(3).  59 Fed. Reg. 4799 (Feb. 2,
1994).
INVESTMENT TAX CREDIT-ALM § 4.03[12].* The
taxpayer operated a chain of grocery stores and claimed
investment tax credit for heating, ventilating and air
conditioning equipment used in the stores. The court held
that the HVAC equipment was not eligible for the
investment tax credit because it was not used solely for the
benefit of other machinery but was also used for the comfort
of customers. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Comm’r, 94-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,016 (9th Cir. 1993).
IRA. The taxpayers withdrew a portion of their funds in
an IRA and used the funds to purchase a residence. The
court held that the withdrawal was a taxable distribution
because the investment of IRA funds in a personal residence
was not a permissable investment for IRA funds. Harris v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-22.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayer transferred
an apartment complex to a corporation wholly-owned by the
taxpayer in exchange for similar property purchased by the
corporation for the exchange. The transfer was eligible for
like-kind exchange treatment under I.R.C. § 1031 because
the escrow account used for the sale of the property to the
corporation and the purchase of the exchange property had
significant restrictions on its use so that the escrow account
could not be considered as constructively received by the
taxpayer. Fredericks v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1994-27.
PARTNERSHIPS-ALM § 7.03.*
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES. The IRS has
ruled that a business organized under the Alabama Limited
Liability Company Act could be taxed as a corporation or
partnership, but would be taxed as a partnership if the
articles of organization restricted the transferability of
interests and required the dissolution of the company upon
termination of a member’s interest unless all members agree
to continue the company. Rev. Rul. 94-6, I.R.B. 1994-3, 11.
A general partnership changed its form to a limited
liability company under a state LLC act. The LLC was ruled
to be a partnership for federal income tax purposes because
the LLC lacked the corporate characteristics of free
transferability of interests and continuity of life. The IRS
also ruled that the conversion did not cause the recognition
of gain or loss under I.R.C. § 721 because no termination of
the original partnership occurred. The IRS also ruled that
the LLC could use the cash method of accounting because
no partner was a C corporation and the LLC was not a tax
shelter. Ltr. Rul. 9350013, Sept. 15, 1993.
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has issued compliance
options and sanction limitations applicable to sponsors of
employee retirement plans which voluntarily request
consideration under the Employee Plans Closing Agreement
Program (see Internal Revenue Manual 7(10)54, Ch. 11)
and the Voluntary Compliance Resolution Program (see
Rev. Proc. 92-89, 1992-2 C.B. 498, as modified by, Rev.
Proc. 93-86, I.R.B. 1993-29, 73). Rev. Proc. 94-16, I.R.B.
1994-5.
The IRS has announced the cost-of-living adjusted
limitation on benefits under qualified defined benefit
pension plans:
  I.R.C. Section                                                                                                                                                                                                 1994 limitation
401(a)(17), 404(l) (OBRA 1993) $150,000
401(a)(17), 404(l) (no OBRA 1993) 242,280
402(g)(1) 9,240
408(k)(2)(C) 396
408(k)(3)(C) (OBRA 1993) 150,000
408(k)(3)(C) (no OBRA 1993) 242,280
409(o)(1)(C)(ii) 660,000
414(q) 99,000, 66,000
415(b)(1)(A) 118,800
415(c)(1)(A) 30,000
415(b)(2)(G) 66,000
4980A(c)(1) 148,500
IR 94-3, Jan. 13, 1994.
A corporation entered into deferred compensation
agreements with several top executives. The agreements
also provided for interest to accrue on the deferred
compensation amounts and the corporation claimed a
deduction for the interest that accrued each taxable year.
The court held that the interest was deductible because the
agreements were bona fide and legally binding on the
corporation and the interest represented the time value of the
deferred compensation. The tax Court had denied the
deductions, arguing that the interest was subject to the
corporation’s ability to pay and the interest rate would
increase if the corporation’s ability to pay decreased, thus
producing larger deductions at a time when the corporation
was least likely to pay the interest. Albertson’s, Inc. v.
Comm’r, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,016 (9th Cir.
1993), rev’g, 95 T.C. 415 (1990).
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that penalties will
not be assessed against taxpayers affected by the Los
Angeles area earthquake on January 17, 1994, for returns
and payments due between January 15, 1994 and February
28, 1994, so long as the returns and payments are made by
February 28, 1994. NR 94-8, Jan. 25, 1994.
The IRS has announced that Form 8815, Exclusion of
Interest from Series EE U.S. Savings Bonds Issued After
1989, revised in December 1993, has been further revised to
reflect retroactive changes made by OBRA 1993. Ann. 94-
18, I.R.B. 1994-5, 52.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c]*
TERMINATION. A shareholder of an S corporation
transferred stock to two trusts, intending that the trusts
qualify as QSSTs. However, because of a failure of
communication among the shareholder’s accountant, lawyer
and estate planner, the QSST election was not timely filed.
The IRS waived the termination of the S corporation
election as inadvertent. Ltr. Rul. 9402009, Oct. 5, 1993.
TARGETED JOBS TAX CREDIT. The IRS has ruled
that an employer may not claim targeted jobs tax credit for
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employees who began employment between June 30, 1992
and August 10, 1993 unless the employer had requested
certification or received a preliminary determination of
status by the date the employment began. Thus, retroactive
certification of employees is ineffective to qualify an
employer for the retroactive period for the targeted jobs tax
credit. Rev. Rul. 94-8, I.R.B. 1994-5.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
February 1994
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 3.96 3.92 3.90 3.89
110% AFR 4.36 4.31 4.29 4.27
120% AFR 4.76 4.70 4.67 4.65
Mid-term
AFR 5.34 5.27 5.24 5.21
110% AFR 5.88 5.80 5.76 5.73
120% AFR 6.42 6.32 6.27 6.24
Long-term
AFR 6.33 6.23 6.18 6.15
110% AFR 6.97 6.85 6.79 6.75
120% AFR 7.62 7.48 7.41 7.37
LABOR
AGRICULTURAL EMPLOYEES-ALM § 3.02.* The
defendant owned and operated a farm and owned and
operated a helicopter crop spraying business. The
defendant’s employees maintained, supplied and transported
the helicopters and generally assisted the pilots in spraying
crops on other farms. Some of the work was performed at
the defendant’s business site and some on the client’s farms.
The Secretary of Labor sued the defendant under the Fair
Labor Standards Act for failure to pay minimum wages and
overtime wages to these employees and failure to keep
adequate records. The defendant argued that the employees
were exempt agricultural workers. The court held that the
loading of the helicopters on the trailers, filling of water and
chemical tanks, transporting of the helicopters to the job
sites, and the flushing of the chemical tanks were exempt
agricultural labor. The court also held that the cleaning and
mechanical maintenance of the trailers and helicopters were
not exempt agricultural labor. Reich v. Tiller Helicopter
Services, Inc., 8 F.3d 1018 (5th Cir. 1993).
FARM LABOR CONTRACTORS-ALM § 3.04.* The
plaintiffs were migrant agricultural laborers hired by one
defendant who performed farm labor contracting for the
other defendant. The plaintiffs were injured while being
transported to a job site and alleged violations of the
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Workers’ Protection Act
(MSAWPA) for failure to provide safe transportation, the
Fair Labor Standards Act (FSLA) for failure to pay
minimum wages, and failure to withhold and pay FICA and
FUTA taxes. The employer argued that it was not liable for
the violations because the plaintiffs’ allegations identified
only the actions of the contractor. The court held that the
employer would be liable for failing to ensure that the
contractor complied with MSAWPA and for the contractor’s
failure to pay minimum wages and withholding taxes. The
court also held that the plaintiffs had a right to bring a
private action to enforce the FICA and FUTA requirements.
Campbell v. Miller, 836 F. Supp. 827 (M.D. Fla. 1993).
HOUSING. The plaintiff was a vegetable grower who
hired the defendant migrant workers to work on the farm.
The plaintiff provided mobile homes for the workers but
required a $150 security deposit paid by deducting $5 per
week from the wages of the employees. After a
disagreement over housing, the defendants ceased
employment and the plaintiff filed a declaratory judgment
action to determine whether the housing arrangement was a
lease subject to the Michigan summary proceedings statute,
the Michigan Consumer Protection Act and the Michigan
Truth in Lending Act. The court held that housing
information given to the employees in compliance with the
Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act
did not create a landlord-tenant relationship between the
parties but was only evidence of an employment
relationship where housing was furnished to employees as a
condition of employment. De Bruyn Produce v. Romero,
508 N.W.2d 150 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
MORTGAGES
MORTGAGEE IN POSSESSION. The plaintiffs were
the heirs of a decedent who owned farm land, a portion of
which the decedent had sold to the defendant, the decedent’s
son, for a promissory note. The decedent’s will bequeathed
the note to other heirs who brought a foreclosure action
against the defendant for nonpayment on the promissory
note. The defendant claimed that the decedent was a
mortgagee in possession and the plaintiffs as heirs had the
burden to prove that no payments were received. The
plaintiff claimed that the decedent had received payment in
the form of income from the farming of the sold land. The
court held that although the decedent and defendant had
farmed together, the defendant had admitted farming the
land in question for four of the eight years; therefore, the
defendant failed to show that the decedent had possession of
the land for the eight years.  Thus, the burden remained with
the defendant to prove that any payments were made on the
note and the court upheld the trial court finding that no
payments were made. Karnes v. Marrow, 864 S.W.2d 848
(Ark. 1993).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PERFECTION-ALM § 13.01[2].* The Chapter 12
bankruptcy debtors had purchased by installment contract a
dairy farm, personal property and 80 head of cattle. The
installment contract provided that the seller retain title to the
property until all payments were made and that the debtor
purchase insurance on the cattle with the seller named as the
beneficiary. The debtor was also required to operate the
premises in a “husband-like” manner and to prevent any
“lessening of the security.” The seller filed a financing
statement within 20 days after the debtor obtained
possession of the cattle but no specific security agreement
was created. The debtor had previously granted a security
interest in all of the debtor’s farm products, including
livestock. The court held that the cattle seller had a
perfected purchase-money security interest in the cattle and
ordered trial on the issue of whether the security interest
covered any of the proceeds of the sale of the debtor’s cattle
in the bankruptcy case. Matter of Traudt, 161 B.R. 242
(Bankr. D. Neb. 1993).
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TRESPASS
TIMBER. The plaintiff owned a wooded area
neighboring the co-defendant’s land. The neighbor hired
the other co-defendant to cut timber from the neighbor’s
land. However, when the co-defendants marked the
boundary for the plaintiff’s land, the boundary was marked
incorrectly. The co-defendants did not contact the plaintiff
about the boundary or the timber cutting and the co-
defendants removed several large old trees on the plaintiff’s
property. The plaintiff testified that the woods were used
for hunting and hiking. The court held that the damages for
the trees was limited to the fair market value of the trees as
lumber because the plaintiff made no special use of the
trees. The court also awarded treble damages under Iowa
Code § 677.10 because the co-defendants’ failure to make
reasonable inquiry as to the true boundary showed an
intentional cutting of the plaintiff’s trees. Drew v.
Lionberger, 508 N.W.2d 83 (Iowa Ct. App. 1993).
CITATION UPDATES
Smith S Inc. v. Comm’r, 837 F. Supp. 130 (E.D. N.C.
1993) (S corporation election), see Vol 4, p. 162.
AGRICULTURAL LAW MANUAL
by Neil E. Harl
This comprehensive, annotated looseleaf manual is an
ideal deskbook for attorneys, tax consultants, lenders and
other professionals who advise agricultural clients. The
book contains over 900 pages and an index.
As a special offer to Digest subscribers, the Manual is
offered to new subscribers at $115, including at no extra
charge updates published within five months after
purchase. Updates are published every four months to keep
the Manual current with the latest developments. After the
first free update, additional updates will be billed at $35
each in 1994.
For your copy, send a check for $115 (WI residents add
$5.75 sales tax) to Agricultural Law Press, P.O. Box 5444,
Madison, WI 53705.
Satisfaction guaranteed. 30 day return privilege.
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